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Abstract 
Operational researchers, risk and decision analysts need consider many behavioural issues.   Despite many OR 
applications in nuclear emergency decision support, the literature has not paid sufficient attention to behavioural 
matters.  In working on designing decision support processes for nuclear emergency management, we have 
encountered many behavioural issues. In this paper we synthesise the findings in the literature with our experience 
and identify a number of behavioural challenges to nuclear emergency decision support. In addition to challenges 
in model-building and interaction, we pay attention to a behavioural issue that is often neglected: the analysis 
itself and the communication of its implications may have behavioural consequences.  We introduce proposals to 
address these challenges. First, we propose the use of models relying on incomplete preference information, 
outlining a framework and illustrating it with data from a previous decision analysis for the Chernobyl Project. 
Moreover, we reflect on the responsibility that rests on the analyst in addressing behavioural issues sensitively in 
order to lessen the effects on public stress. In doing so we make a distinction between System 1 Societal 
Deliberation and System 2 Societal Deliberation and discuss how this can help structure societal deliberation in 
the context of nuclear emergencies.  
Keywords: behavioural OR; incomplete preference information; multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA); 
nuclear emergency preparedness and management; societal decision-making. 
1 Introduction 
Recently there has been a resurgence of interest in the behavioural aspects of OR studies (e.g., 
Hämäläinen et al. 2013, Katsikopoulos and Gigerenzer 2013, Hämäläinen 2015, Franco and 
Hämäläinen 2016). Generally OR studies seek to shape human behaviour within organisational, 
industrial and societal processes in order to improve some aspect of their performance. To achieve this 
there are inevitable behavioural interactions with decision-maker (DMs), managers, workers, 
stakeholders and other participants.  Here we consider aspects of Behavioural OR (Hämäläinen et al. 
2013) within the civil nuclear sector.  Two reasons make this sector pertinent to our discussion.  First, 
nuclear energy is an emotive topic and the stress and dread it arouses in many stakeholders makes many 
behavioural issues clearly apparent. Secondly, because of public concerns risk analyses and decision-
making need be explicitly analytic and open to audit.  This has meant that many techniques of risk and 
Nuclear Emergency Decision Support: a Behavioural OR perspective 
Date Printed:  22/03/17 - 2 - 
 
 
decision analysis have found early applications within the sector, particularly in developing emergency 
planning, management and recovery processes post-Chernobyl.  
Despite many OR applications in nuclear emergency decision support, the literature has not paid 
sufficient attention to behavioural matters. For instance, our discussion surfaces a behavioural impact 
that is not so obvious in other contexts.  In any human activity, there is potential for unintended effects. 
In the case of nuclear safety, the very logic, process and reporting of an analysis can have behavioural 
consequences leading to impacts that are of the same order as those that are being addressed (see Section 
3.3). In our experience, behavioural issues are also overlooked in practice. For instance, in our recent 
experience with supporting an exercise with a group of scientific experts in devising national-level 
emergency plans for Government, we found that experts may not only be unaware of the behavioural 
biases that can affect their understanding, but also confident that, as experts, they will not be misled by 
such behavioural issues (French et al. 2016). There is therefore a gap in the literature (and in practice) 
about the behavioural issues affecting nuclear emergency decision support. Our paper aims to specify 
this in detail and put forward proposals to address it. In this endeavour we take a Behavioural OR 
perspective. 
Behavioural OR is a nascent discipline, and its boundaries and definitions are still unclear.  Behaviour 
is itself a portmanteau concept carrying many meanings.  Here we aim to be inclusive of those covered 
in the Behavioural OR literature so far (see, e.g., Becker 2016, Franco and Hämäläinen 2016), covering 
issues relating to both model-building and interaction as well as impacts that stem from actual use of 
the models in practice. Specifically, our discussion identifies behavioural challenges to the application 
of decision analytic methods in nuclear emergency management: behavioural effects in the elicitation 
of judgements and values; the cognitive load on DMs, experts and stakeholders; and behaviourally 
induced psycho-social and health impacts arising from the poor communication of model results. We 
explore two routes for addressing these challenges:  
 The use of robust decision-analytic models relying on incomplete information; we shall detail how 
this can help with behavioural issues in preference elicitation and model-interaction.   
 Structuring deliberation processes with stakeholders and the public with regard to risk-mitigation 
and communication. We note the need to consider the behavioural impacts arising from the 
justification and presentation of the underpinning analysis and its conclusions.  
Our discussion is organised as follows. In Section  2 we provide the background to the discussion in the 
remainder of the paper. We first summarise the context and processes of emergency planning in relation 
to potential radiation accidents at nuclear plant. We then briefly discuss the implications of behavioural 
decision studies for the practice of decision analysis, noting current perspectives on the distinction for 
individuals between System 1 Thinking (i.e. subconscious responses to stimuli) and System 2 Thinking 
(i.e. conscious decision-making driven by analysis). We also provide a brief review of the use of multi-
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criteria decision analysis in a nuclear-emergency context. In Section 3 we outline a set of challenges for 
decision analysis and societal decision processes in the context of nuclear emergency management. We 
synthesise the findings in the relevant literature but also highlight issues that have not been discussed 
in this so far. In Section 4 we suggest two ways of addressing these challenges. First, we look to 
developments in decision analysis for working with incomplete preference information. We put forward 
a framework for evaluation under incomplete information in nuclear emergency decision support and 
illustrate this with an example using data from the International Chernobyl Project. Second, we develop 
a distinction between informal System 1 Societal Deliberation and formal, constitutionally allowed or 
required System 2 Societal Deliberation, which parallel that between System 1 and System 2 Thinking 
in individuals. We use this to make suggestions on how to structure societal deliberation in the context 
of nuclear emergencies. Finally, in Section 5 we draw some conclusions and summarise a research 
agenda. 
2 Background: nuclear emergency management, behavioural and 
decision science. 
This section provides some background for our discussion. Firstly, we discuss how are nuclear 
emergencies planned for and managed, and what societal decision processes are needed in long term 
recovery. Secondly, we discuss the process of prescriptive decision analysis and how may it can be and 
has been used in this context – in doing so, and because our later discussion will draw on the behavioural 
findings on individual choice and judgement, we also briefly discuss System 1 and System 2 thinking 
in individuals. 
2.1 Nuclear emergency planning and management 
The Daiichi Fukushima Disaster, coming 25 years after Chernobyl, emphasised that society must have 
robust, sensitive emergency management processes to respond to any future radiation accident.  Much 
general guidance on these has been developed by, e.g., the International Commission on Radiation 
Protection (ICRP) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  During the normal running of 
nuclear plants, many preparations, including exercising, for potential emergencies, without which no 
site would be licensed.   
Typically radiation accidents are described as evolving through a number of phases, broadly: threat, 
immediate response and long term recovery.  If an accident threatens, a number of actions would be 
taken (Ehrhardt and Weiss 2000, Lindell 2000): most obviously, engineering actions to avoid or 
mitigate the risk.  Our concern is with decisions on off-site countermeasures to protect the public such 
as: warning the public; distributing stable iodine tablets; advising people to shelter; evacuating those 
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most at risk. If a significant release occurs, further countermeasures include food-bans, restrictions on 
activities, and establishing an exclusion zone. In the longer term, it may be necessary to consider 
permanent relocation of some inhabitants, and changes in agricultural practice, business and economic 
activity.  Early decisions will be driven primarily by the imperative to avert radiation dose; later ones, 
however, will need consider stress-related health, socio-economic and environmental impacts.  Such 
decisions are clearly societal issues.  It is acknowledged that the values of all stakeholders, and the 
public in general, should be an input to the decision-making process, along with input from technical 
modelling, experts and economic information (see e.g. ICRP 2009, IAEA 2011).   
Many aspects of emergency management rest upon OR analyses (see Altay and Green 2006, Tomasini 
and Wassenhove 2009 for recent surveys, Galindo and Batta 2013), but our focus is on multi-criteria 
decision analysis (MCDA), stakeholder engagement and public participation to support to the 
development of responses.  
2.2 System 1 and System 2 Thinking in individuals 
Intuitive judgements and decision-making are examples of System 1 Thinking (Chaiken et al. 1989, 
Milkman et al. 2009, Kahneman 2011). Such thinking tends to be superficial, on the fringes or outside 
of consciousness, and subject to behavioural biases; indeed, its literature is often somewhat pejoratively 
labelled heuristics and biases (Kahneman and Tversky 1974).  Behavioural studies have found 
numerous examples of System 1 behaviour (Kahneman and Tversky 2000, French et al. 2009, Morton 
and Fasolo 2009, Montibeller and von Winterfeldt 2015). A repeated finding is that, individuals 
consistently fail to take into account relevant information other than the most easily discernible (see 
e.g. Tversky et al. 1988, Payne et al. 1993). Similarly, individuals fail to consider objectives consistently 
(Bond et al. 2008).  Particular issues facing emergency management are how individuals and groups 
understand communications about risk, uncertainty and conflicting objectives (Fischhoff 1995, Bennett 
and Calman 1999, Kasperson et al. 2003, Maule 2008, Bennett et al. 2010), their responses being 
mediated by national, organisational and professional culture (Douglas 1992, Hofstede 1994). 
As risk and decision analysts, we adopt more conscious, analytic patterns of thought, known as System 
2 Thinking. Whether there is a true dichotomy or a gradation between subconscious informal and 
explicit formal thought is moot in behavioural science (Shleifer 2012), but for our purposes a simple 
distinction serves.  Being conscious of System 2 Thinking, we can test it for rationality, ensuring that it 
is well founded.  Not all conscious thinking is rational; some is very dubious.  However, in responding 
to nuclear accidents, there is a clear need for more rational, auditable forms that draw in wider sources 
of information and evaluate options carefully using explicit, well structured, well founded System 2 
analysis.  Decision theories provide many normative models of how rational decisions should be made 
(e.g., Keeney and Raiffa 1976, French 1986, Bouyssou et al. 2006).  We adopt a perspective based on 
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subjective probability, and particularly value and utility theories (French and Rios Insua 2000, Smith 
2010). 
2.3 Prescriptive decision analysis for nuclear emergency management 
Many writers on decision analysis have discussed processes, interactions and ways of communicating 
which enable analysts help individuals break out of System 1 Thinking and follow System 2 analyses 
(French 1984, Bell et al. 1988, Katsikopoulos and Fasolo 2006, Edwards et al. 2007, French et al. 2009, 
Milkman et al. 2009).  DMs think and respond instinctively with System 1 Thinking; yet we need to 
draw them into the rational System 2 Thinking that underpins the analyses: see Figure 1.  Indeed, even 
careless analysts may fall prey to System 1 Thinking.  Effective elicitation procedures have been 
developed to help DMs, experts and stakeholders respond to questions about their understandings, 
uncertainties and values in ways compatible with the assumptions underpinning the analysis. The 
processes catalyse reflection and learning, helping make a more informed decision.  Thus the processes 
are aimed at modifying their System 1 behaviours through the growth of understanding (see, e.g., 
Phillips 1984, Bell et al. 1988, Edwards and Fasolo 2001, O'Hagan et al. 2006, Edwards et al. 2007, 
French et al. 2009). 
 
Figure 1: Prescriptive Decision Analysis 
MCDA has proved its worth in participatory decision-making and deliberative democracy (Gregory et 
al. 2005, Rios Insua and French 2010, Gregory et al. 2013), providing support both for deliberation and 
communication. It helps individual participants move away from System 1 Thinking towards System 2 
Thinking, building a more balanced view of the issues.  It facilitates communication, e.g. in using 
sensitivity analysis (French 2003).  It also provides a framework in which to report to stakeholders and 
the public.  With the power of the web, simple MCDA analyses may be displayed interactively for 
anyone to explore and understand their perspective on the issues (Atherton and French 1999, Morton et 
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al. 2009).  Many papers have appeared examining methodological and practical aspects of using MCDA 
in nuclear emergencies ( French et al. 2007, Papamichail and French 2013).  MCDA is not a quick 
process, so it has not been seriously proposed for use during the threat and release phases, instead 
finding its place in training exercises as a means to articulate discussion of potential trade-offs.  In the 
recovery phase there is time to deliberate and balance costs and benefits; again MCDA proving to be a 
very useful tool.  
One of the first applications of MCDA within the context of nuclear accidents was in five decision 
conferences arranged as part of the International Chernobyl Project (IAEA 1991, Lochard et al. 1992, 
French et al. 2009).  Their purpose was to investigate the factors driving decision-making in the affected 
areas of Ukraine, Belarus and the Russian Federation.  A clear conclusion was that decision-making 
had sought to balance the costs and effects, but the effects included not just radiological impact, but 
also stress-related health effects and political acceptability to different groups of the population: see the 
attribute hierarchy shown in Figure 2.  Socio-political consequences of countermeasures, e.g. 
psychological stress and political acceptability, were significant factors, although not taken into account 
by conventional cost-benefit analysis (CBA).  
 
Figure 2: Final Attribute Hierarchy developed in the Summary Decision Conference 
The decision conferences involved many government stakeholders, although not the public. Today these 
would be termed stakeholder workshops, and were an early step towards more participatory decision-
making in the nuclear sector. Papamichail and French (2013) provide a comprehensive survey1 of 
subsequent developments and conclude that (p. 484): “MCDA has supplanted CBA to become the main 
approach to supporting decision-making on recovery after a major radiation accident”.   French et al. 
(1992) described the Chernobyl workshops as ‘group interviews’, taking a strongly behavioural view 
of their design and value.  Generally, however, the OR literature on decision support has not paid 
substantial attention to many behavioural aspects of the interaction of models with people. In hindsight 
                                                     
1  The website of the NERIS network (www.eu-neris.net) also has much relevant material. 
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this seems surprising, since stakeholders’ preferences and judgements are an integral component of the 
decision-analytic process. 
3 Behavioural challenges 
In this section we discuss behavioural challenges to the use of MCDA in decision support for nuclear 
emergency management. Firstly, we examine the normative foundations of MCDA and consider how 
common assumptions have important implications in terms of the behavioural patterns that the analysis 
is able to encompass. Secondly, we consider prescriptive modelling, particularly the behavioural 
challenges to elicitation and interaction with stakeholders. Thirdly, we consider model use and highlight 
the unintentional impacts that even sound modelling can have in practice. 
3.1 Normative modelling: multi-attribute risk-aversion 
Most, if not all, existing work within the nuclear-emergency management literature is grounded on the 
established paradigm of Multi-Attribute Value/Utility Theory (MAUT/MAVT). In this setting, additive 
value/utility functions are most commonly used to model preferences elicited from individuals/groups 
and structure the discussion. There are indeed very good reasons for this: a) additive models are easy to 
explain and seem intuitive to DMs, and b) the use of additive models has a long tradition in practice. 
Whilst recognising this, we want to highlight, via the following example, a feature of these models with 
problematic implications in the nuclear emergency management context. 
Nuclear accidents affect wide areas where radionuclides are deposited, which may necessitate the 
establishment of exclusion zones and relocation of the population (as was the case for Chernobyl) or 
the establishment of zones where agriculture and economic activity is banned. Thus, part of longer-term 
remediation involves efforts to restore portions of such areas to the extent possible. Consider a choice 
between two such alternative strategies, A and B, for restoring local Urban and Rural Environments. 
Their effectiveness is scored on a common 0 – 100 scale, where 0 and 100 denote complete success and 
complete failure of the restoration processes. The effectiveness of both strategies is uncertain (so they 
are lotteries) and each have a 50/50 chance of yielding the results specified in Figure 3. 
𝐴: {
50% (0,0)          
50% (100,100)
 
    
𝐵: {
50% (100,0)
50% (0,100)
 
Figure 3: A choice between two lotteries A and B. (U, R) denote the Urban and Rural scores. 
 
These lotteries are strikingly different: B has a 100% chance of successfully restoring one of the 
Urban/Natural environments, whereas A has 50% chance of restoring neither. One would expect that 
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the choice between these lotteries should be subject to debate – and that, within an MCDA-driven 
process, this dialogue would be part of preference elicitation. Yet, this would be pointless! The reader 
can easily verify that for any additive multi-attribute utility function (where 𝑢1(∙), 𝑢2(∙) are the partial 
utility functions for each attribute respectively), the overall expected utility of these lotteries will be the 
equal: 𝑢1(0) + 𝑢2(0) + 𝑢1(100) + 𝑢2(100). Further, if a multiplicative multi-attribute function is 
employed, then lottery A will necessarily be deemed preferable to lottery B: (𝑢1(100) −
𝑢1(0))(𝑢2(100) − 𝑢2(0)) > 0. Often in practice, rather than eliciting utilities, an additive value 
function is used. This is either used as a reasonable proxy for a utility function, or, alternatively, the 
analysis involves further applying a concave transformation to the value function scores, so as to 
encompass risk-aversion. In the former case, the above problem persists. In the latter, the transformation 
requires a) establishing a parametric form for the transformation, and b) eliciting values for its 
parameters. This last task is far from straightforward. as evidence from behavioural experiments provide 
no clear answer about the nature of the transformation between value  and utility (see e.g. Smidts 1997, 
Abdellaoui et al. 2007).  
Clearly any model requires assumptions; but it is also clear from the above example that the normative 
tools employed impose heavy assumptions about stakeholder preferences. Can these assumptions 
reasonably encompass pertinent patterns of behaviour? We suggest not: consider the case of multi-
attribute risk-aversion. One of a few concepts of risk-aversion in the multi-attribute setting is 
correlation-aversion (see e.g. Richard 1975, Denuit et al. 2010), which effectively describes a DM who 
prefers to hedge bets2. Such a DM would be averse to choosing strategy A in the above example, and 
instead prefer strategy B which offers the certainty of some type of environment restoration in any 
event. 
One may make the case that in mitigating disastrous consequences, DMs would be likely to opt for 
strategies that offer a reasonable chance of success in every scenario considered, hence exhibiting 
correlation-aversion. At any rate, we argue that if such patterns of behaviour are to be discounted, this 
should not be done a priori, rather endogenously, as a result of the dialogue and elicitation process. 
This would require models that are able to encompass different attitudes of multi-attribute risk-aversion 
– a point that we shall pick up again later in Section 4.1.2. 
                                                     
2 For the case of two attributes this DM would prefer a 50/50 gamble between a fixed loss in either attribute vs a 
50/50 gamble of no loss in either attribute and the same fixed loss in both. 
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3.2 Preference elicitation and prescriptive modelling 
In this section we collect evidence from case-studies on the challenges facing MCDA for nuclear 
emergency management, focussing on two aspects: a) problem structuring and model-building; and b) 
elicitation of preferences. 
3.2.1 Model-building and model-interaction 
Several problems are reported in the literature relating to behavioural issues in model-building and 
model-interaction. One such is the effect of behavioural issues in the problem-structuring phase and the 
construction of the value tree (i.e. the hierarchy of attributes). Hämäläinen et al. (2000) report that 
constructed value trees differed in a set of nuclear-emergency planning exercises. In the related problem 
of disposal of nuclear waste, Borcherding and von Winterfeldt (1988) report similarly that re-structuring 
the value tree had an effect on the elicited attribute weights. Further, there are concerns about the 
capacity of DMs and stakeholders to understand or accept the concepts/tools used in engagement and 
deliberation. In the context of a planning exercise for a nuclear emergency Hämäläinen et al. (2000) 
note that the elicitation of utility functions was particularly problematic and question whether they did 
actually represent the participants’ risk-attitudes. Morton et al. (2009) report similar problems about the 
elicitation of (swing-) weights in the context of nuclear-waste disposal; participants indicated, instead, 
that a holistic comparison of disposal strategies appeared more meaningful. 
Since Chernobyl there have been many studies reflecting back on Chernobyl or developed around 
hypothetical future accidents. The broad family of the criteria in Figure 4 have been repeatedly 
identified (Hämäläinen et al. 2000, Geldermann and Rentz 2003, Mustajoki et al. 2007, Andrews et al. 
2008, Larsson et al. 2010).  However, during our work on the NREFS project3, we became concerned 
that there may a tendency to consider too few criteria, e.g. ignoring environmental aspects. Perhaps we 
are being blinded by the specifics of the Chernobyl Accident and failing to think as widely as may be 
needed for a quite different accident. If we are, that would be an example of a behavioural bias on the 
part of analysts becoming anchored on the available memory of a past event. 
3.2.2 Trade-off and preference elicitation 
Preference elicitation is, in general, known to be affected by several biases, including both the elicitation 
of partial value or utility functions and the elicitation of attribute weights. In their extensive review, 
Montibeller and von Winterfeldt (2015) report – inter alia – that the elicitation of partial values is 
particularly affected by anchoring bias, gain-loss bias and the certainty effect; and also that the 
elicitation of weights is prone to splitting and equalising biases. We take these findings as read, and do 
                                                     
3  Management of Nuclear Risk Issues: Environmental, Financial and Safety, led by City University, London 
and carried out in collaboration with Manchester, Warwick and the Open Universities, funded by the UK EPSRC 
as part of the UK-India Civil Nuclear Power Collaboration.   
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we refer the reader to Montibeller and von Winterfeldt (2015) for a detailed discussion. Instead, we 
focus on preference elicitation issues particular to the setting of nuclear emergency decision support. In 
this setting, many of the decisions require a trade-off to be made between the potential dose averted and 
costs; and that means that either explicitly or implicitly the DMs have to put a value on a life. Such 
judgements are not easy and many find them impossible to make. Arguably, these trade-offs may be 
seen as taboo trade-offs which individuals are known to be generally unwilling to make (Tetlock et al. 
2000). Furthermore, in the aftermath of a nuclear emergency people may be adjusting to their new 
conditions and, indeed, their values may be changing (French et al. 1997, Heriard Dubreuil et al. 1999). 
This makes elicitation more difficult. The effect is that judgemental inputs elicited from stakeholders 
could be highly biased and, as such, produce biased results. The issue is further compounded by 
potentially different attitudes among stakeholders, leading to a wide disagreement about the ‘right’ 
trade-off values to guide the analysis. In our experience, insisting on the elicitation of contentious trade-
offs amplifies dissonance in the group and ultimately the credibility of both the process and the results 
are hindered. 
In addition, several studies have reported that different preference elicitation methods can lead to 
fundamentally different results (see e.g. Lichtenstein and Slovic 1971 who first reported preference 
reversals between different elicitation methods in the context of risk preferences, Knetsch and Sinden 
1987  in the context of eliciting certainty-equivalents). The elicitation of preferences is also plagued by 
‘noise’, taken to mean changes in responses to the same question repeated at different times 
3.3 Behavioural impacts arising from analyses  
Analysis inevitably has costs: time, effort and computational costs are obvious.  But there are other 
costs and one of these is little appreciated.  Namely, the logic and assumptions of analysis can cause 
impacts, usually through stakeholder and public concerns and stress, which can be very significant.  An 
example is provided by a simple mathematical model developed as the basis for risk management and 
licensing of nuclear plant and radiation related activities (ICRP 2007); but if not fully understood or 
used inappropriately, it has a huge potential to raise public stress and change behaviour.  
Despite decades of studies, the risks of chronic low level exposure to radiation, i.e. the same order as 
background radiation, are poorly understood (Kamiya et al. 2015, Thomas and Symonds 2016).  Due 
to the unavailability of data, radiation protection science has taken data from much higher exposures, 
which do bring increased risks of cancers, and interpolated linearly back to the origin: see Figure 3.  
Thus, all exposure to radiation, however small, is assumed to have a cancer risk: there is no safe 
threshold.  This linear no-threshold model (LNT) model is applied relatively simplistically in many risk 
analyses, multiplying the population at risk and the length of exposure to give the expected number of 
cancers sometimes with poor assumptions on the spatio-temporal distributions of the contamination. 
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Atmospherically dispersed contamination is often assumed to cover the entire planet and to provide 
equal risk wherever radiation occurs. With the world population around 7 billion, and some 
radionuclides having half-lives of thousands of years, it is easy to calculate expected numbers of cancers 
arising in the thousands, if not tens of thousands (Steinhauser et al. 2014).   
 
Figure 4: The Linear No-Threshold (LNT) Model. Note that for the purposes of  
schematic representation, we do not give units nor values. 
This conservative LNT assumption is eminently sensible in risk management since it ensures a continual 
downward pressure to reduce exposures and their health effects.  Yet the same analysis presented in 
risk communication can lead to the opposite outcome: creating negative health effects through raised 
stress. During the International Chernobyl Project, it became apparent stress-related health effects were 
of the same order as those caused the radiation risk (Havenaar et al. 2003, Rahu 2003, IAEA 2006, 
Bromet and Havenaar 2007).  In 1996, 10 years after the Accident, morbidity estimates arising from 
stress4 in contaminated areas of Belarus suggested that more than two thirds of the public were affected 
(Karaoglou et al. 1996). Early indications are similar about the Daiichi Fukushima Disaster (Nomura et 
al. 2013, IAEA 2015, Murakami et al. 2015). 
We argue that such behavioural impacts stem from a lack of appreciation of the difference risk 
management and emergency management. Risk management, concerns what might happen: one is 
considering a wide range of potential scenarios and wishes to guard against untoward consequences in 
a conservative way, so that modelling assumptions are always on ‘the safe side’. Emergency 
management concerns what has happened: one needs to manage an actual situation and ideally the 
consequence models should be unbiased, representing what is really likely to happen. However, in 
crises, modellers often lean to the familiar and quickly available. The modellers know the assumptions 
and limitations of these, but the DMs and, subsequently, the public and stakeholders may not.  Few 
                                                     
4  This is not to imply that some aspect of public panic or irrational ‘radiophobia’ is involved.  There are very 
sound reasons to feel stressed if one is involved in a radiation accident and the recovery from it. 
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reporters and, sadly, far from all scientists realise that in using models designed conservatively for risk 
management they may grossly overestimate the consequences of an actual accident. As the 
consequences of the Chernobyl Accident have shown: misusing and misunderstanding mathematical 
models can cause real harm (Blandford and Sagan 2016).  We noted the extensive literature on the 
communication of risk in Section 2.2; however, the particular issue of the behavioural impacts that can 
arise from oversimplified presentation of the results of mathematical models has received less attention.  
3.4 Societal deliberation 
Decision-making in groups, organisations and companies has formal accountabilities, responsibilities 
and authorities defined in the governance structures which stipulate how decisions should be made. 
Democratic constitutions provide carefully structured deliberative and communication systems to allow 
citizens to participate in deliberative democracy.  Yet the behaviours and interactions that actually 
determine the decisions may be much more informal. ‘Water-cooler’ discussions can effectively bypass 
formal discussion. Information Systems studies in organisations (see e.g. Chan 2002) often reflect on 
tensions between hierarchical organisational charts with carefully structured lines of authority and the 
informal processes used in day to day activities to shortcut the overheads that such formality brings.  
Discussions on Twitter may lead public debate as much as any government guidance, particularly in 
times of crisis (see, e.g., Thomson et al. 2012 for interactions on Twitter after Fukushima).  The Social 
Amplification of Risk is an example of an early theory that over the years has suggested explanations of 
negative effects of informal public debate and how better public risk communication mitigate these 
(Kasperson et al. 2003) 
While there are formal accountability structures that de jure define how power and authority are 
distributed and decisions are made, informal ones can de facto dominate. This parallels with the System 
1 and System 2 dichotomy of individual thinking.  For this reason we shall refer to informal discussions 
and interactions in organisations and societies as System 1 Societal Deliberation and the formal ones as 
System 2 Societal Deliberation.  Note that we are not positing a ‘group mind which takes decisions’ 
within the group, but rather noting that group discussion can proceed along informal or formal channels.  
We noted that conscious System 2 Thinking need not be rational.  To ensure that it is, analyses need to 
be structured according to some normative paradigm of rational thought.  Similarly not all forms of 
group and societal deliberations correspond to commonly agreed definitions of good governance; the 
literature is replete with many paradoxes and impossibility theorems indicating this (Arrow 1963, 
Grudin 1994, Koning 2003, Rios Insua and French 2010).  Thus it is not easy to help groups and 
societies towards sound System 2 Societal Deliberation, but it is something that we should aspire to.  
Just as individual System 1 Thinking can engender stress and unwise behaviours, so too can System 1 
Societal Deliberation ranging from withdrawal and disinterest to disruptive public protest.  
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Misunderstandings of the issues may increase and, in our context, this may raise psychological stress 
and its health impacts. Reflecting back to the Chernobyl Accident, the Soviet Union invited the IAEA 
to organise the International Chernobyl Project because of public concerns and protests, i.e. disruptive 
System 1 Societal behaviours, against the ‘35 REM’ recovery strategy that was then being proposed. 
They hoped that the Project would stimulate a formal debate, i.e. a System 2 Societal Deliberation, 
which would help reassure and calm the public concern. The challenge was and remains how to balance 
Systems 1 and 2 Societal Deliberation in managing the response and recovery. 
4  Addressing the challenges: proposals 
The literature on MCDA within nuclear emergency management has not, so far, considered how to 
address behavioural issues in elicitation and model interaction, nor in societal deliberation. Here, we 
make several proposals to address them. Firstly, we start with a proposal for structuring MCDA 
processes on the basis of models relying on incomplete information. We discuss their advantages in 
practice, both in general but also in relation to the challenges identified previously. We then discuss a 
general evaluation framework under incomplete information and specify how this may be used for 
nuclear emergency decision support. Secondly, we discuss proposals for structuring societal 
deliberative behaviours, paying attention to the interplay between formal constitutional processes and 
informal stakeholder and public discussion. 
4.1 Robust decision-analytic models for nuclear emergency decision 
support 
4.1.1 Use of incomplete preference information 
We propose the use of MCDA methods that can accommodate ‘incomplete preference information’ (see 
e.g. Salo and Hämäläinen 1992, Salo and Hämäläinen 2010 and the references therein). We provide a 
specific example of how such methods can be applied to nuclear emergency decision support. Broadly 
speaking, these approaches work on the principle that precise judgemental values need not be elicited 
from DMs where this proves difficult. For example, upper and lower bounds can be used for the value-
of-life, and we would be expect such weaker statements to be easier to agree than an exact figure. 
Various other forms of such ‘incomplete information’ can also be elicited, and we discuss several in the 
following sections. The main principle being that there is a gamut of alternative questioning modes with 
differing judgmental loads, and that the analysis should only consider those which the DMs can 
comfortably provide. Relating to the challenges identified earlier, this can have several advantages. 
1. Cognitive Load and Biases. Section 3.2 discussed problems in preference-elicitation reported 
on MCDA for nuclear emergency management. These demonstrate that the value-judgements 
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required of DMs can be onerous. This may be because the judgements relate to a genuinely 
contentious task (cf. trade-offs between costs and averted radiation doses), or because DMs 
may find it hard to understand and relate to the questions and tools used (cf. the elicitation of 
utility functions for life-expectancy, deaths averted, etc. or the use of disaggregate comparisons 
in general). There is a fundamental question (see e.g. Harrison 1992) about the precision of 
elicitation methods: whether we could meaningfully elicit point estimates – a common practice 
in MCDA for nuclear emergency management – or whether instead interval responses is the 
best possible. Given the evidence reported above, one may indeed raise questions about the 
validity of such responses, especially in regards to judgements that implicitly place a value on 
life. The use of incomplete (preference) information can be of obvious help: use can be made 
only of “cognitively valid” (Larichev 1992) responses, i.e. to questions which the DM is 
considered able (or reports being able) to understand and relate to; alternatively, the elicitation 
of ranges can be pursued instead of point estimates. We shall discuss later and in more detail 
how this may be performed in nuclear emergency decision support and provide an illustrative 
example. Furthermore, evidence from Behavioural Economics suggests that use of incomplete 
preference information may also help in avoiding biases. Hey et al. (2009) conduct an 
experimental study to compare the combined effect of bias and noise using different elicitation 
methods: pairwise choices (incomplete information) and a number of mechanisms for certainty-
equivalent elicitation (point estimates). Their results indicate that pairwise choices are in most 
cases superior to the precise elicitation mechanisms, “having in general smaller noise and no 
significant bias”. Our view is that while the use of models relying on incomplete information 
cannot altogether avoid biases, it may be able to do so partially: if a precise elicitation mode 
(e.g. eliciting a value for life) subsumes the information conveyed by one using incomplete 
information (e.g. eliciting bounds on the value for life), one might reasonably expect that the 
latter should be no more prone to bias than its precise counterpart. In any case, the use of 
incomplete information can be an alternative to de-biasing techniques: if certain responses are 
(experimentally) found to or suspected to be biased, then the analysis can proceed utilising only 
partial (hence incomplete) preference information. 
2. Focus and Agreement: The value judgements required in nuclear emergency decision support 
can be difficult and contentious. Especially after a crisis, stakeholders may hold distinctly 
different views and the process of agreeing through dialogue can be delicate (Lochard et al. 
1992). How should this dialogue evolve? In answering this question, one needs to consider the 
impact of any disagreement on the results and recommendations. Some disagreements may be 
critical in that respect, but others may not. Thus the dialogue would benefit by focusing on the 
former, rather than on the latter which may risk stalling the process (Gregory et al. 2005, 
Gregory et al. 2013). Using incomplete information offers a way to do this: groups may agree 
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on ranges and weaker statements initially e.g. bounds on the value of an averted death. Thus it 
is possible to incrementally uncover judgmental issues which are genuinely contentious, in the 
sense that any disagreement does affect the results, rather than via undertaking back-end 
sensitivity analysis. Overall this permits the elicitation process to focus where there is genuine 
need for more attention and removes unnecessary stumbling blocks to consensus. 
3. Robustness and wider Acceptability. In addition to the disagreement between workshop 
participants about contentions value judgements, experience from Chernobyl and Fukushima 
has shown that the public itself may have a very different attitude about these judgements 
(Drottz-Sjöberg and Sjoberg 1990, Tateno and Yokoyama 2013).  However sound the analysis 
and recommendations of a participative decision analysis, its recommendations are inevitably 
part of a wider societal process that may be influenced by other political or popular factors (see 
also Section 4.2). In the related problem of nuclear waste disposal in the UK decisions national 
participative decision analysis led to the adoption of geological disposal (Morton et al. 2009), 
but local participative decision making has completely stalled the process  (Gilbert et al. 2016). 
In view of this, we suggest that, instead of placing the focus of the analysis on identifying a 
unique recommendation, this can shift to identifying a set of acceptable strategies which would 
be more robust against a wide set of preference scenarios (see also Roy 2010 for a wider 
discussion on robustness in MCDA). Incomplete preference information offers a route to 
achieving this, as shown in an example below. A particular point to note is that building models 
based on incomplete information allows for assurance levels to be introduced through 
appropriate constraints. Specifically, models can be built to ensure that any recommendation 
will be unanimously preferable to a set of targets and reference outcomes (e.g. the outcomes of 
a past crisis or a minimally acceptable outcome in terms of morbidity/mortality characteristics). 
This last point is particularly important in view of the lessons learnt about public acceptability 
through the International Chernobyl Project. 
4.1.2 Use of non-additive models 
In Section 3.1 we noted the issues posed by different attitudes to multivariate risks in the use of additive 
or multiplicative value/utility functions and suggested that models that are able to encompass such 
attitudes may be required. This, we argue, is particularly true in the context of disaster management and 
recovery: following a major disaster, DMs (and policy makers) would be particularly averse to 
strategies with high probability of failing or underperforming across all pertinent attributes and may 
thus prefer options where that allow for ‘hedging’ risks. This necessitates the use of non-additive 
models.5 
                                                     
5 We point out that non-additive in this context refers to models that do not enforce to an additive decomposition 
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The literature, particularly at the interface with Economics and Statistics, offers a set of methods, 
dealing with multi-attribute Stochastic Dominance which could prove valuable (see e.g. Eeckhoudt et 
al. 2007, Shaked and Shanthikumar 2007, Denuit and Eeckhoudt 2010, Abbas 2011). In general these 
derive rules for comparing multi-attribute lotteries under different preference patterns (e.g. related to 
risk-aversion as discussed in Section 3.1). These, however, are not immediately applicable in our 
setting. Firstly, they concern specific cases where attributes can be a priori classified as complementary 
or substitutable6 – which may prove difficult to ascertain and restrictive to assume over the entire 
attribute domain. Secondly, the methods have only normative imperatives and little has been done to 
develop them into prescriptive tools. 
A recent approach, CUT (Argyris et al. 2014), offers a way to address these issues. This can 
accommodate elicited preference information and so can be used prescriptively. Moreover, it employs 
general concave multi-attribute utility functions and thus is not restricted to the specific preference 
patterns of additive and multiplicative models discussed earlier, nor does it require specifying whether 
the attributes are global complements or substitutes. The same is true of a similar approach by 
Armbruster and Delage (2015). Finally, the CUT approach can decompose risk attitudes and 
preferences over multi-attribute bundles. This means that preferences may be elicited in a riskless 
context and the same judgements can be fed into a model comparing lotteries with no adjustment and 
without assuming risk neutrality (we refer the reader to the aforementioned paper for details). We shall 
illustrate this later with an example. This is an important advantage in the context of nuclear 
emergencies (and crises in general), where the elicitation of preferences under certainty is itself already 
contentious to DMs and the introduction of probabilities can overburden them as discussed earlier in 
Section 3.2.1.    
We consider that these methods promise a way forward. We do, however, re-iterate the more general 
case for using incomplete information in this setting, and recognise that other MCDA methods will have 
much to contribute in this relatively unexplored research topic. For a further discussion on this topic, 
we refer to the proposals in the paper by Larsson et al. (2010). 
4.1.3 A framework for nuclear emergency decision support 
We introduce a framework for nuclear emergency decision support: namely, how the evaluation of 
alternative strategies can be structured under a prescriptive protocol and relying on incomplete 
                                                     
and not to models that are necessarily incompatible with such a decomposition: preferences fed to these models 
may well move them towards an additive form, but this is not assumed a-priori. In this sense a more accurate, yet 
stylistically awkward, terminology would be “not-necessarily additive models”. 
6 Formally, the sign of the second cross-derivatives of the utility functions needs to be specified. 
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information. The following section introduces the general structure on which the framework is based; 
the subsequent one describes it in detail in the context of nuclear emergencies. 
4.1.3.1 Evaluation under incomplete information 
A general structure of how evaluation under incomplete information can proceed is provided in Figure 
5 below. The framework consists of three components: Data, Model and Preferences. We underline 
that this is not a new alternative to various frameworks in the literature based on different MCDA 
methods. Our focus here is not on the methods used, rather on the specification of this general 
framework in the setting of nuclear emergency decision support, which we detail in the following 
section. Thus the structure below is deliberately general: it can be used with different MCDA methods 
e.g. those based on non-additive models discussed in the preceding section. The structure is rooted on 
the literature on evaluation based on the Stochastic Dominance, used in decision and risk analyses (see 
e.g. Buckley 1986). In contrast to this, however, the framework is prescriptive and specifically designed 
to be used with elicited preferences. 
 
Figure 5: General Evaluation Framework under Incomplete Preference Information 
4.1.3.2 Specification for nuclear emergency decision support 
In the following we provide a more detailed discussion of the framework and describe it specifically in 
the context of decision support for nuclear emergencies. 
Data 
The Data component falls within the remit of scientific modelling and expert judgement, often under 
the direction of a government bodies and politicians. For example, in the United Kingdom the Scientific 
Advisory Group for Emergencies is responsible for coordinating scientific advice to inform decision-
making and reports to senior Government. Such a body can be responsible for devising scenarios (𝑆𝑡) 
to consider in emergency planning and training exercises – e.g. the particulars of radionuclide release 
into the atmosphere, the weather, the location – and a set of response strategies (𝑋𝑗) to be considered – 
e.g. distribution of iodine tables, sheltering, evacuation etc. These scenarios can then be used in 
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technical modelling (e.g. atmospheric dispersion models) to estimate consequence data for all strategies 
(𝑋𝑗(𝑆𝑡), where 𝑗 and 𝑡 index the strategies and scenarios respectively) across a number of attributes 
(e.g. those in Figure 2). In French et al. (2016) we report on constructing such scenarios and associated 
consequences during a recent UK study involving many experts. French et al. (2007) provide a 
discussion on incorporating technical consequence modelling into nuclear emergency decision support. 
Furthermore, experts can be asked to provide probabilities for each scenario (𝑝(𝑆𝑡)). We note here that 
the elicitation of probabilities from experts is itself subject to behavioural biases (see e.g. Montibeller 
and von Winterfeldt 2015). The issue is however distinct from the behavioural issues relating to 
preferences and societal deliberation considered here. For an extensive discussion and practical 
guidance on eliciting and aggregating expert judgment, see O'Hagan et al. (2006). 
Model and Preferences 
The Model and Preferences components of the framework fit with the practice of facilitated stakeholder 
workshops. There is a variety of approaches for structuring and conducting such work workshops in the 
OR literature; Franco and Montibeller (2010) provide an extensive review. Here we focus on facilitated 
MCDA in the spirit of previous work in the nuclear emergency setting (see e.g. Papamichail and French 
2013). Traditionally, the facilitator engages the group, and through dialogue elicits their preferences 
and constructs a utility model, i.e. a utility function 𝑢(∙) (or, sometimes, a value function) assumed to 
belong to some class of functions 𝒰 with certain properties.  In the proposed framework, elicitation 
does not seek to fully specify 𝑢(∙). Instead, it leads to a set of incomplete/imprecise preference 
statements over a set of reference outcomes 𝑅, collectively denoted ≿𝑅. These statements could take 
several forms: 
 To address the problems reported by Morton et al. (2009), regarding the acceptability of 
disaggregated comparisons by stakeholders concerning radioactive waste disposal, holistic 
ordinal comparisons can be elicited: of the form 𝑋(𝑆𝑡) ≿𝑅 𝑌(𝑆𝑡′). The advantage of holistic 
vs disaggregated choices is that participants would not have to worry about ‘unknown’ levels 
in the attributes that not being compared. To avoid the difficulty in comparing several criteria 
at a time the outcomes 𝑋(𝑆𝑡) and 𝑌(𝑆𝑡′) can be chosen to differ in one or a small number of 
attributes only. The use of outcomes under certainty also avoids the problem that DMs have 
difficulty understanding and relating to the concept of utility functions, as reported by 
Hämäläinen et al. (2000) for a nuclear emergency planning exercise. Further, with an 
appropriate model (Section 3.2.1), considering outcomes under certainty also avoids the 
problem of pre-specifying how to transform a value scale to a utility scale. The example below 
illustrates this preference elicitation in the nuclear emergency context. 
 We argued (Section 3.1) that in mitigating the consequences of a disaster, DMs may be 
correlation-averse. To capture different attitudes multi-attribute risks, lottery comparisons may 
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be elicited. These take the form 𝑋 ≿𝑅 𝑌, where 𝑋 and 𝑌 are strategies (lotteries). The strategies 
can differ in one or several attributes, across scenarios, or in their probability profiles. 
 To help individuals and groups respond to contentious questions (e.g. implicit trade-offs 
between cost vs mitigation of health impacts of radiation, see Section 3.2.2) we suggest the 
elicitation of ranges or relative ranges for utility/value and expected utility scores. Ranges take 
the form: 𝑢(𝑋(𝑆𝑡)) ∈ [𝑢
𝐿 , 𝑢𝐻] or 𝐸[𝑢(𝑋)] ∈ [𝐸𝐿 , 𝐸𝐻]. Relative ranges take the form: 
𝑢(𝑋(𝑆𝑡)) ∈ [𝛼𝑢(𝑌(𝑆𝑡′)), 𝛽𝑢(𝑌(𝑆𝑡′))] or 𝐸[𝑢(𝑋)] ∈ [𝛼𝐸[𝑢(𝑌)], 𝛽𝐸[𝑢(𝑌)]]. Again, with a 
suitable model such preference statements can also be taken into account. The reduced 
cognitive load from specifying ranges or making simple comparisons may be more acceptable 
to DMs uncomfortable with the concept of a utility function, and thus also alleviate some of 
the problems reported by Hämäläinen et al. (2000). 
The elicitation modes above are listed in increasing order in terms of cognitive load: from simple ordinal 
queries to more demanding ratio queries. All, however, are weaker than the elicitation of precise values 
and trade-offs as is commonplace in MCDA. We do not prescribe here the use of some of these vs 
others. Instead, all should be considered as available questioning modes used to capture whatever 
preferences the DMs can comfortably or practically provide.  
Evaluation 
In Section 4.1.1 we suggested that it is more realistic to consider the recommendations of nuclear 
emergency decision support as input to a wider societal/political process. We argued that a more 
practical focus of the analysis should be on identifying a set of acceptable strategies which would be 
robust against a wide set of preference scenarios. We also argued that public acceptability can addressed 
by introducing assurance levels in the evaluation, through the use of reference outcomes that exemplify 
minimally acceptable outcomes.   The framework introduced above is structured exactly on these two 
ideas. 
The (incomplete) preferences elicited in the facilitated workshops would do not instantiate a model, i.e. 
construct a unique utility function 𝑢(∙). Instead, they define a restricted class of utility functions 𝑢[𝑅] ⊂
 𝒰 : those compatible with both modelling assumptions and elicited preferences ≿𝑅. This class does not 
normally identify a single ‘optimal’ strategy. Instead, the paradigm shifts towards identifying just those 
recommendations that can be unanimously agreed. Specifically, a strategy 𝑋𝑗 is declared preferable to 
(or dominates) another 𝑋𝑘 if this is unanimously the case for all 𝑢(∙) ∈ 𝒰[𝑅] compatible with the 
incomplete preference information (i.e. if 𝐸[𝑢(𝑋𝑗)] ≥ 𝐸[𝑢(𝑋𝑘)] for all compatible 𝑢(∙) ∈ 𝒰[𝑅].). We 
use ≿𝒰[𝑅] to denote unanimous dominance between strategies 𝑋𝑗. The non-dominated strategies would 
comprise the shortlist from which an eventual choice can be made. At this point the focus can shift from 
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stakeholder engagement back to scientific expertise and, perhaps more importantly, a political process, 
which can encompass specialist evaluation. 
The evaluation of strategies within the proposed framework can be enriched further by ‘filtering’ 
strategies that perform unanimously better than specified assurance levels. In particular, reference 
strategies 𝑋𝑅 can be devised, corresponding to what might be seen as targets to beat. Then the set of 
proposed strategies can be filtered by identifying those unanimously dominated by one or more of 
the 𝑋𝑅. Such targets can be set to help reassure the public that minimum levels of effectiveness will be 
kept. Alternatively they may be set to correspond to particularly poignant reference outcomes, e.g. based 
on some past event. We do, however, note that this raises an issue about precedent, which we discuss 
further in Section 4.2.1. 
We will not describe here the mathematical formulation for computing unanimity-dominance, i.e. 
whether 𝑋 ≿𝒰[𝑅] 𝑌 holds for a pair of strategies 𝑋, 𝑌. This is of course model-specific. We have argued 
for the use of concave utility functions, for which the formulations can be found in Argyris et al. (2014), 
and we shall illustrate this with an example in the following section. There are also many models 
available based on additive utility functions: see e.g. Jacquet-Lagreze and Siskos (1982), Siskos et al. 
(2005), Salo and Hämäläinen (1992) and Salo and Hämäläinen (2010). 
4.1.4 Illustrative example: the Chernobyl Project revisited 
We provide an illustrative application of the proposed evaluation framework in the context of nuclear 
emergency decision support, specifically how to best protect the public following the consequences of 
a nuclear accident. 
Data 
We use the only real data from an application of MCDA in this setting: data from the Chernobyl Project 
(Lochard et al. 1992, French 1996). The Chernobyl Project used MCDA to evaluate four alternative 
strategies (𝑋1, … , 𝑋4) under certainty. Each of these strategies corresponded to different levels of 
relocation of the local population. To illustrate the proposed framework in a more complex setting 
(uncertainty) we modified the data to convert each of the four original strategies into a lottery. This was 
done by considering the original data for each strategy as a most likely ‘median’ scenario to which a 
probability of 50% was assigned. Two further scenarios were considered, an ‘optimistic’ and a 
‘pessimistic’ one, each being assigned a probability of 25%7. The data for all four strategies (lotteries) 
are given in Table 1. The attributes correspond to the tree used in the final decision conference of the 
Chernobyl Project, see Figure 2. Some of the data are based on radiological calculation (numbers of 
                                                     
7 For every strategy, the pessimistic (optimistic) outcome provides 90% (110%) of the original outcome for each 
attribute except where this was already at the minimum (maximum) possible level. 
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cancers and costs in millions of Roubles) and the rest (e.g. acceptability) were are judgemental values 
elicited from stakeholders. The data can be used as is in the proposed evaluation framework (but could 
also converted to a 0-100 scale for all attributes). 
 
Strategies Scenarios 
 
 
 
 
Fatal 
Cancers 
Averted 
 
(𝐴1) 
Hereditary 
Cancers 
Averted 
 
(𝐴2) 
Stress 
(0-100) 
 
 
(𝐴3) 
Acceptability  
(Affected 
Region) 
(0-100) 
(𝐴4) 
Acceptability 
in 
(USSR) 
(0-100) 
(𝐴5) 
Costs 
(millions 
of 
Roubles) 
(𝐶) 
 
𝑋1 
Median 3200 500 0 0 0 28 
Pessimistic 2880 450 0 0 0 28 
Optimistic 3520 550 0 0 0 28 
 
𝑋2 
Median 1700 260 80 80 25 17 
Pessimistic 1530 234 72 72 22.5 17 
Optimistic 1870 286 88 88 27.5 17 
 
𝑋3 
Median 650 100 100 100 100 15 
Pessimistic 585 90 90 90 90 15 
Optimistic 715 100 100 100 100 15 
 
𝑋4 
Median 380 60 50 20 75 14 
Pessimistic 342 54 45 18 67.5 14 
Optimistic 418 66 55 22 82.5 14 
Table 1: Dataset for the illustrative example. 
Model 
To evaluate the strategies we adopt a utility function with the following decomposition and taking its 
expectation over scenarios: 
𝑢 (𝑋𝑗(𝑆𝑡)) = 𝑤 × 𝑈
𝐴 (𝐴1,𝑗(𝑆𝑡), … , 𝐴5,𝑗(𝑆𝑡)) − (1 − 𝑤) × 𝑈
𝐶(𝐶), 
𝐸[𝑢(𝑋)] =  ∑ 𝑝(𝑆𝑡) × 𝑢 (𝑋𝑗(𝑆𝑡))
𝑡
. 
In the above we assume that the utility function 𝑈𝐴(∙) is a concave function over the first five attributes 
(i.e. except the cost). This is done to capture different attitudes to multi-attribute risks as discussed in 
Section 3.1. Utility function 𝑈𝐶(∙), on the other hand, is a single attribute function over costs, which is 
assumed to be convex (so that −𝑈𝐶(∙) is concave). We do not consider specific parameterisations for 
these functions. Instead, we assume only that both 𝑈𝐴(∙) and −𝑈𝐶(∙) belong to a general class of 
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functions 𝒰 which includes all concave functions that are non-decreasing in their respective attributes. 
An additive decomposition of the two functions is used, using weight 𝑤 for 𝑈𝐴(∙) and (1 − 𝑤) for 
𝑈𝐶(∙). While this framework is not restricted to this case, we adopt it partly to illustrate that additive 
decompositions can be accommodated. More importantly, this decomposition for the trade-off between 
costs and all other attributes seems a reasonable assumption. In the background, cost represents all other 
(foregone) uses that the money can facilitate; since there are a multitude of such uses preferential 
independence between cost, on the one hand, and the rest of the attributes, on the other hand, seems 
acceptable. Finally, we will illustrate that the framework can be used without specifying a specific value 
for 𝑤. Instead we will consider the entire range 𝑤 ∈ [0,1] and thus ascertain whether this trade-off does 
impact on the results and to what extent. 
Preferences 
As discussed in Section 4.1.3.2, the framework can accommodate a multitude of elicited preference 
statements. Here we chose the preferences fed to the model based on four criteria. Firstly, we want to 
illustrate that the model allows elicitation to merely consider outcomes under certainty. The class of 
functions 𝒰[𝑅] includes all concave functions that are compatible with a set of preference statements: 
as such it will include not only value functions that represents the statements under certainty, but also 
all concave transformations of these functions, i.e. all utility functions that not only represent the 
original statements, but also the risk-attitude of the DM (Argyris et al. 2014).  Secondly, and perhaps 
most importantly, we chose the preference statements to use so that, in the absence of a real DM, they 
are as realistic as possible. To achieve this we use preference statements elicited as part of the decision 
conferences of the Chernobyl Project (French 1996). This involved, inter-alia, the elicitation of ‘swing 
weights’, by comparing two attributes at a time and eliciting a precise value between the swing of 
receiving nothing vs the maximum attainable outcome in one vs another attribute. As these correspond 
to a disaggregate comparison (i.e. assuming that the level of the attributes not being compared is 
immaterial), we generalised them to holistic comparisons as follows: a) we considered the swing 
between a pair of attributes while fixing the other attributes at some level (the average level across all 
attainable outcomes in each attribute); b) we did not use precise ratings, but used instead only the ordinal 
preferences implied by each swing-weigh elicitation; c) for two statements only we allowed for 
specification of conservative lower bounds for the ratio of two pairs of utility/value scores (again, these 
were also implied by the answers elicited in the Project). All in all, the preference statements used (i.e. 
 ≿𝑅) were four ordinal statements and two bounded ratio statements:  
𝑈𝐴(1483, 230, 100, 50, 50) > 𝑈𝐴(3520, 230, 58, 50, 50) > 𝑈𝐴(1483, 230, 58, 100, 50)
> 𝑈𝐴(1483, 550, 58, 50, 50) > 𝑈𝐴(1483, 230, 58, 50, 100), 
𝑈𝐴(3520, 230, 58, 50, 50) ≥ 1.1 × 𝑈𝐴(1483, 230, 58, 100, 50), 
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𝑈𝐴(1483, 230, 58, 100, 50) ≥ 1.2 × 𝑈𝐴(1483, 550, 58, 50, 50). 
We used no preference information on the trade-off between cost and non-cost attributes. Further, we 
did not specify any statements that might help with restricting the utility function over costs −𝑈𝐶(∙): 
we merely assumed that this is a concave and non-decreasing function. 
Results 
We computed unanimity dominance (i.e. ≿𝒰[𝑅]) for all pairs of strategies considered (by solving a 
modified linear optimisation problem in Argyris et al. (2014) to allow for the additive decomposition 
between costs and the other attributes). Figure 6 below summarises the results. 
 
Figure 6: Results of the illustrative example 
The results bring to the fore some very robust conclusions. Firstly, strategy 𝑋1 should never be 
implemented as it is dominated for any value of the trade-off 𝑤. Further, strategy 𝑋4 is dominated for 
the significant majority of the range for 𝑤 (i.e. for any 𝑤 ≥ 0.13); thus this may also be considered an 
unacceptable strategy in view of this very small value. This leaves two potentially acceptable strategies: 
𝑋2 and 𝑋3, and these may be considered as the shortlist that can be brought forward to be part of a wider 
political/societal debate. Comparing the results here with the MCDA of the original Chernobyl Project, 
these do seem to be broadly in line. In the original project strategy 𝑋1 was also always dominated. 
Strategy 𝑋4 was non-dominated as well but as here would only be chosen for very low values of 𝑤. The 
only significant difference between these results and the results of the Chernobyl Project is that in the 
latter, strategy 𝑋2 was always dominated whereas here it is always non-dominated. This is not so 
surprising: after all, we considered only a small portion of the preferences used in the Project and under 
more general assumptions. Our results can be refined further by considering more and stronger 
preference statements, particularly in regards to the utility function for costs which was here not touched 
at all in the elicitation. This however is less important than what we think is the conclusion drawn from 
these results: that even under more general assumptions, less elicited preferences and in the presence of 
uncertainty, most of the Project’s conclusions seem to hold true, and can thus now be evidenced to be 
robust. 
0 1 
𝑤 
0.13 
Dominated Strategies 
𝑋1 𝑋1, 𝑋4 
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4.2 Structuring societal deliberative behaviours 
As decision analysts we should develop decision processes within System 2 Societal Deliberative 
mechanisms to ensure that the ultimate decision is legitimate, but we should be aware of possible 
System 1 Societal Deliberations and use these positively where possible.  Moreover, we need to watch 
for potential negative effects of System 1 Societal Deliberations and calm any negative effects of these, 
reducing stress and encouraging wiser behaviours. Many of the developments in risk communication, 
public participation and deliberative democracy may be seen as steps to reduce the gap between System 
1 and 2 Societal Deliberation and the potential effects of this gap (McDaniels and Small 2004, O'Hagan 
et al. 2006, Renn 2008, Bennett et al. 2010).  Contrast the formal structured approach to nuclear 
emergency management and response common 15 to 25 years ago (Lindell 2000, Carter and French 
2006) with the much more inclusive approach incorporating formal and informal interactions currently 
being promoted by organisations such as NERIS (www.eu-neris.net) or Nuclear Transparency Watch 
(NTW 2015). 
4.2.1 Precedence and societal anchoring 
One of the consequences of taking any decision is that it sets a precedent and expectations for any future 
similar decision.  This may be seen as anchoring within System 1 Societal Deliberation; c.f. the 
anchoring bias identified within System 1 Thinking (Kahneman and Tversky 1974).  In both the 
Chernobyl and Fukushima Accidents, it was feasible to evacuate the local population and create an 
exclusion zone.  In the case of Chernobyl, Pripyat was a substantial town, but it was the only substantial 
town within 30km of the plant and, moreover, the majority of its economy revolved around the plant, 
the rest of the region being agricultural with no other significant infrastructure or economic activity 
within 30km of the plant. The creation of an exclusion zone was costly, but feasible.  In the case of 
Fukushima, the radiation accident was a part of a much larger catastrophe in which the Tsunami had 
devastated large swathes of land and infrastructure and killed around 20,000 people. Evacuating the 
population and creating an exclusion zone was a dreadful consequence of the radiation release; but, in 
the context of the Tsunami’s devastation, it would seem less dramatic and thus more feasible. The 
circumstances of a future accident may be such that it is feasible politically or economically much less 
physically to establish an exclusion zone. Even sheltering may be difficult, if housing is not of a 
sufficient standard to provide sufficient shielding.  Moreover, sheltering can only continue for a few 
hours, perhaps a day or two; so if the release continues for an extended period, people will need to be 
evacuated through the plume. 
Such precedents may cause many societal issues in the event of a future accident. Stakeholders and the 
public may expect the response and recovery to be managed in a way that is impossible in the 
circumstances. One can imagine that the dislocation between public expectations and the strategies 
actually implemented will lead to many System 1 Societal Deliberative behaviours.  Indeed, it is sad to 
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report that such behaviours and the growth of stress related health impacts is becoming manifest in the 
regions around the Fukushima plant (IAEA 2015). 
4.2.2 Prescriptive Decision Analysis for Groups 
Above we identified a number of challenges pertaining to behavioural issues for MCDA in supporting 
nuclear emergency management. Much has already been done on the impacts and effectiveness of 
public risk communication (e.g., Drottz-Sjöberg and Sjoberg 1990, Havenaar et al. 2003),  but much 
still remains to be done to understand how individuals and society will respond and participate in in the 
event of a future accident.  Indeed, there is still much to be done generally in managing Societal System 
1 and 2 Deliberative behaviours effectively in many contexts.  In Section 2.3, we noted the complex 
interplay between System 1 and System 2 Thinking in supporting individuals. We need to recognise the 
need for a similar interplay between System 1 and System 2 Societal Deliberation in designing processes 
for stakeholder engagement and public participation: compare Figure 7 and Figure 1. We need 
deliberation processes which lead to decisions being made according to constitutional rules of 
government, but which are informed by and broadly commensurate with all the informal discussions 
among stakeholders and the public. 
In the aftermath of the Daiichi Fukushima Disaster, the tension between the very formal processes of 
Japanese constitutional governance and the informal public debate is very clear.  Efforts are being made 
to introduce more participatory methods, but there are cultural issues in taking methods developed 
elsewhere into Japan. The FAIRDO project is a good example of this8; see also the discussion in Suzuki 
(2014) which focusses more on System 2 Societal Deliberation.  Building trust is clearly important 
(Tateno and Yokoyama 2013), as might be expected from many previous more general studies (Renn 
and Levine 1991, Slovic 1993, Beierle and Konisky 2000, French et al. 2002).  Participatory methods 
are also seen as key in developing agreement on longer term remediation and nuclear waste disposal 
(Lawless et al. 2011).  
We are a long way from being able to design decision analyses embedded in processes which effectively 
balance System 1 and 2 Societal Deliberation perspectives.  Bayley and French (2008) suggested that 
MCDA resource allocation models might be used to design public participation processes that 
encourage positive participation and avoid some of the negative effects of System 1 Societal 
Deliberation, though they did not use this terminology.  The recent use of system dynamics to model 
the social amplification of risk may offer an alternative way forward (Busby and Onggo 2012,  see also 
Gilbert et al. 2016).  However, as  Bayley and French (2011) noted, we need many more studies of 
different forms of participatory methods to identify best practice.  There have been few comparative 
studies to establish the relative effectiveness of different participatory methods. When, for instance, is 
                                                     
8 www.iges.or.jp/en/scp/fairdo/ 
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a citizens’ jury more appropriate than a town hall meeting?  Marttunen et al. (2013) compare five 
stakeholder engagements in the environmental domain; while Slotte and Hämäläinen (2014) make some 
suggestions about good practice based on the little existing evidence. But research is needed if we are 
to design processes to mitigate the negative effects of System 1 Societal Deliberation. The NERIS 
network (www.eu-neris.net) is currently trying to make such comparative evaluations with a view to 
identifying further best practice in the context of nuclear emergency planning and the recovery from 
such events.  But it will be a long time before usable results emerge; and there is a need for much 
broader, more substantial research. 
 
Figure 7: Prescriptive Societal Decision Analysis 
5 Conclusions 
Behavioural OR is clearly relevant to nuclear emergency management.  Broadly we have identified 
three areas in which more work is needed on the behavioural aspects of conducting, communicating 
and implementing decision analytic support for emergency response and recovery. Ideally we need 
behavioural models to predict the consequences of different strategies, although building such models 
in the context of the emergency planning for, response to and recovery from a radiation accident is 
extremely difficult; and we have not addressed this issue.  Rather, we have focused on three other broad 
areas.   
Nuclear Emergency Decision Support: a Behavioural OR perspective 
Date Printed:  22/03/17 - 27 - 
 
 
Firstly, we need to recognise that individuals may understand and offer judgements on the basis of 
System 1 Thinking, thus risking irrational and inconsistent behaviour.  To protect against this we need 
prescriptive approaches which challenge System 1 Thinking, driving participants towards explicit, 
auditable and more rational analyses based on System 2 Thinking.  We have also suggested that it may 
be possible to base such analyses on less complete preference elicitation than has been the case in the 
past.  In particular, we have discussed how we can work with incomplete information on the more 
contentious preference judgements and proposed a framework for structuring analyses on this basis. 
Most MCDA analyses in the context of nuclear emergency management have used multi-attribute value 
approaches and then softened the assumptions underpinning these through sensitivity techniques.  
Incomplete preference elicitation may be as effective in a more direct manner.   
Secondly, we have noted that groups may interact in a variety of ways, some formal, some informal.  
The former we have termed System 2 Social Deliberation and by this we mean the open, formal ways 
of discussing and deciding which are established in the governance structures of groups.  But equally 
we have recognised that there are many informal, less public, less auditable forms of communication 
and discussion outside those recognised by the governance structures.  These shape the thinking of 
individuals and subgroups but are seldom addressed and considered in the design of decision processes.  
We noted that Bayley and French (2008) suggested how multi-attribute resource allocation ideas might 
be used to think about the design (see also Marttunen et al. 2013), but to do so we need much more 
comparative information on the effectiveness of different formal public participation and deliberative 
methods.  This requires much more attention to the comparative evaluation of such methods than has 
been common in previous studies (Bayley and French 2011). 
Finally, we have pointed to a third behavioural issue: the models we use, the analyses we conduct, the 
results and conclusions we communicate can – of themselves – have an impact that is commensurate 
with those of the radiation accident itself.  In the terminology that we have introduced: unless careful 
attention is paid to the communication of analyses and the assumptions and limitations of these, 
uncontrolled, unanticipated and unmonitored System 1 Societal Deliberation – rumour, media 
sensationalism, Twitter storms , etc. – can lead to stress and health impacts in the population.  This 
places a responsibility on the emergency managers and designers of the emergency management 
processes to consider the behavioural impacts not just of the countermeasures and remedial strategies 
that they implement, but also those that arise because of how they make, justify and communicate their 
decisions. Our professional responsibilities must extend beyond conducting the modelling and analysis 
into conveying its implications to DMs, stakeholders and the public in a sensitive manner that is 
comprehensible to all parties concerned. We must continually strive to ensure that everyone understands 
the assumptions and limits of the models concerned, especially when we conduct conservative worst 
case analyses to bound the scale of an accident and the resources that might ultimately be needed. 
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